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STATE OF NEW YORK 
PUBLIC EMPLOYMENT RELATIONS BOARD 
In the Matter of 
VILLAGE OF TARRYTOWN, 
Charging Party, 
- and -
CASE NO. U-27234 
TARRYTOWN PATROLMEN'S BENEVOLENT 
ASSOCIATION, INC., 
Respondent. 
BOND SCHOENECK & KING, PLLC (CHRISTOPHER T. KURTZ, of counsel) 
for Charging Party 
JOHN M. CROTTY, ESQ., for Respondent 
) 
BOARD DECISION AND ORDER 
This case comes to the Board on exceptions by the Tarrytown Patrolmen's 
Benevolent Association (PBA) to a decision1 by an Administrative Law Judge (ALJ) on 
an improper practice charge filed by the Village of Tarrytown (Village), dated November 
26, 2006, alleging that the PBA violated §209-a.2(b) of the Public Employees' Fair 
Employment Act (Act) when it submitted to interest arbitration a demand, as amended, 
for a "Bill of Rights" proposing the establishment of certain guidelines for the Village's 
conduct of interrogations of PBA members during official investigations that may lead to 
any form of charges. 
The ALJ concluded that the PBA's demand constituted a prohibited subject of 
bargaining based on the provisions relating to police discipline contained in 
1
 40 PERB H4540 (2006). 
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Unconsolidated Laws (Unconsol) §§5711-q(8) and (9) and the Court of Appeals 
decision in Patrolmen's Benevolent Association of the City of New York Inc v PERB2 
(hereinafter NYCPBA). The ALJ, therefore, ordered the PBA to withdraw the demand. 
EXCEPTIONS 
In its exceptions, the PBA asserts that the ALJ misinterpreted both the decision 
in NYCPBA and Unconsol §5711-q. 
The PBA contends that the ALJ's interpretation of the Court of Appeals holding in 
NYCPBA is overly broad. Specifically, the PBA argues that the ALJ misinterpreted 
NYCPBA in concluding that a local law, in addition to a special state statute, can render 
police discipline a prohibited subject of bargaining under the Act. The PBA asserts that 
the Court's holding in NYCPBA with respect to the Town of Orangetown's police 
collectively negotiated provision was extremely narrow. According to the PBA, the 
Court's holding was limited to a declaration that the challenged disciplinary arbitration 
clause was unenforceable due to the provisions of Rockland County Police Act (RCPA)3 
thereby affirming the permanent stay of arbitration issued below.4 The PBA claims that 
the Court's decision did not determine or discuss whether RCPA rendered disciplinary 
interrogation procedures for police a prohibited subject of bargaining under the Act. 
In addition, the PBA asserts that the ALJ erred in concluding that the text of 
Unconsol §5711-q(9) precluded negotiations regarding pre-charge disciplinary 
investigations by Village executive officials. The PBA contends, inter alia, that the term 
2
 R NY3H KR3 3Q PFRR fT7finfi OCMR} 
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3
 L 1936, c 526, as amended by L 1946, c 940. 
4
 Town of Orangetown v Orangetown PBA, 18 AD3d 879, 38 PERB U7507 (2d Dept 
2005). 
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"investigation" in Unconsol §5711-q(9) applies only to the powers of the Village's 
legislative body to conduct investigations. In addition, it argues that the power and 
authority to conduct a disciplinary "investigation" under Unconsol §5711-q(9) is 
inapplicable to interrogative questioning prior to issuance of disciplinary charges. 
Finally, the PBA claims that the ALJ's decision is inconsistent with prior Court of 
Appeals precedent including New York City Transit Authority v Public Employment 
Relations Boaro6 (hereinafter NYCTA) where the Court held that a public employee 
does not have an inherent right under the Act to have an employee organization 
representative present at an interrogation but that the right to such representation may 
be obtained through collective negotiations. 
The Village supports the ALJ's decision, citing to NYCPBA and other appellate 
precedent holding that special state statutes can render local police disciplinary 
procedures a prohibited subject of bargaining. In addition, the Village relies upon the 
text and legislative history of Unconsol §5711-q. 
Following receipt of the PBA's exceptions, the Board requested that the parties 
file supplemental briefs on the question of whether the recent amendment to the Act,6 
creating an improper practice for denying employee organization representation during 
certain questioning by an employer, impacts the question of negotiability of the PBA's 
demand. 
Based upon our review of the record and our consideration of the parties' 
arguments, we grant the PBA's exceptions, in part, but affirm the ALJ's decision that the 
PBA's bargaining proposal constitutes a prohibited subject of bargaining. 
5
 8 NY3d 226, 40 PERB H7001 (2007). 
6
 Section 209-a.1(g) of the Act; L 2007, c 244. 
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FACTS 
In lieu of a hearing, the parties agreed to a stipulated record limited to the 
following: the Village's improper practice charge alleging a violation of §209-a.2(b) of 
the Act; the at-issue PBA proposal attached to the charge; the PBA's answer; an 
agreement that the proposal is not a unitary demand; and a letter from the PBA 
withdrawing various components of its proposal with the exception of the PBA's 
interrogation proposal. The proposal, as amended, which relates to establishing certain 
guidelines for the interrogation of PBA member is fully set forth in the ALJ's decision 
and therefore need not be repeated here. 
DISCUSSION 
In 1939, the Legislature repealed a 1936 law7 relating to the establishment and 
operation of village police departments in Westchester County and recodified its content 
as twenty-two provisions in the Village Law.8 Among those provisions were Village Law 
§§199-q and 199-r establishing the administrative structure for village police 
departments as well as the procedures for the discipline and discharge of Westchester 
County village police officers.9 In 1972', the Legislature enacted a special law "Special 
Provisions for Village Police Departments Law" (hereinafter VPDL) that transferred all of 
the 1939 provisions in the Village Law relating to Westchester County village police 
7
 L 1936, c 103. 
8
 L 1939, c 300; Village Law §§199-j-199-ee. 
9
 The ALJ and PBA inadvertently misidentified the applicable special state statute in the 
present case as the Westchester County Police Act (WCPA). The WCPA is a different 
statute, originally enacted in 1936, and applicable to towns within Westchester County. 
See, L 1936, c 104, as amended, L 1941, c 812; Gizzo v Town of Mamaroneck, 36 
AD3d 162, 39 PERB1J7527 (2d Dept 2006), mot Iv den, 8 NY3d 806 (2007); Town of 
Greenburgh v Police Assn of the Town of Greenburgh, 94 AD2d 771, 16 PERB 1J7510 
(2d Dept 1983), mot Iv den, 60 NY2d 551 (1983). 
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departments to the Unconsolidated Laws, including those relating to police discipline.10 
At the same time, the Legislature enacted a new general Village Law disciplinary 
provision: Village Law §8-804.11 
Unconsol §5711-g(8) grants Westchester County village board of trustees or a 
municipal board general administrative responsibilities over village police departments. 
Unconsol §5711 -q(8) states: 
Administration. The board of trustees or municipal board 
acting as police commissioners of any village, may make, 
adopt and enforce rules, orders and regulations for the 
government, discipline, administration and disposition of the 
police department of such village, and the members thereof. 
Any such rules and regulations or any amendment thereto 
shall be in written form and a copy of the same distributed to 
each member of the police department and posted in a 
conspicuous place in the police headquarters. 
The scope of the powers and authority of the Village board of trustees or 
municipal board regarding discipline is set forth in Unconsol §5711-q(9) that provides in 
"[t]he board of trustees or municipal board shall have power 
and is authorized to adopt and make rules and regulations 
for the examination, hearing, investigation and determination 
of charges, made or preferred against any member or 
members of such police force, but no member or members 
of such police force shall be fined, reprimanded, removed or 
dismissed until written charges shall have been made and 
preferred against him or them, nor until such charges have 
been investigated, examined, heard and determined by such 
board of trustees or municipal board in such manner, 
procedure, practice, examination and investigation as such 
board may by such rules and regulations from time to time 
prescribe, except that the trial of such charges shall not be 
delegated and must be heard before the full board of 
trustees or full municipal board, or a majority of the members 
10
 L 1972, c 891. 
11
 L 1972, c 892; Village Law §8-800-§8-804. 
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of either of such boards, and the affirmative vote of a 
majority of such members shall be necessary to a conviction 
on any such charges. 
The primary issue raised by the PBA's exceptions is whether the VPDL renders 
the PBA's interrogation proposal a prohibited subject of bargaining under the holding in 
NYCPBA. Following a careful review of relevant statutes and appellate precedent, we 
conclude that the PBA's interrogation proposal is a prohibited subject of bargaining. 
In NYCPBA, the Court held that when a special state law, that pre-existed Civil 
Service Law (CSL) §§75 and 76, specifically commits the discipline of police officers to 
local government officials, New York's public policy favoring strong disciplinary authority 
over police officers outweighs New York's "strong and sweeping policy"12 supporting 
collective negotiations under the Act. 
The Court in NYCPBA concluded that the public policy underlying two late 19th 
century enactments by the State Legislature granting the New York City Police 
Commissioner control over police discipline, the adoption of a New York City Charter 
provision in 1897 and the enactment of a New York City code provision in 1873, 
rendered discipline a prohibited subject under the Act.13 In addition, the Court concluded 
that the Legislature's enactment of the RCPA in 1936 granting Rockland County town 
boards' power and authority over police discipline outweighed the presumption of 
12
 City of Watertown v New York State Pub Empl Rel Bd, 95 NY2d 73, 78, 33 PERB 
1J7007 at 7014 (2000). 
13
 6 NY3d at 570, 573-574. 
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negotiability of police discipline under the Act with respect to Rockland County towns.14 
At the same time, the Court expressly reaffirmed Auburn Police Local 195 v 
Helsby (Auburn)^5 which holds that a bargaining proposal to modify local government 
police disciplinary procedures under CSL §75 is a mandatory subject of bargaining 
under the Act. The Court distinguished Auburn based on language contained in CSL 
§76(4) which states that CSL §§75 and 76 did not modify preexisting laws. 
In reaching its holding in NYCPBA, the Court cited to and relied upon four earlier 
Appellate Division decisions: Town of Greenburgh v Police Association of the Town of 
Green£>urg/?16(hereinafter Greenburgh); Rockland County Patrolmen's Benevolent Assn 
v Town of C/ar/csfown17(hereinafter Clarkstown); City of New York v MacDonald™ 
As an administrative agency, PERB is duty bound to follow the Court's holding in 
NYCPBA. We note, however, that in reaching its decision, the Court did not discuss or 
analyze the provisions or legislative history of the Act including the 1967 and 1969 
Taylor Committee Reports. Cf. NYCTA, 8 NY3d at 233. Neither the Act's definition of 
"public employee" in §201(7)(a) of the Act nor the Act's legislative history draws a 
distinction between police officers and other public employees with respect to the 
subject of negotiations. The text and legislative history of various later amendments to 
the Act providing for public interest arbitration panels to resolve police negotiation 
disputes strongly suggests a New York public policy favoring the negotiability of police 
disciplinary procedures like other working conditions. See, Act, §§209.2 and 4(c)(v). For 
example, it is notable that although the Legislature excluded the subject of disciplinary 
procedures from consideration during interest arbitrations for a few specific police units, 
it did not prohibit negotiations on the topic for those units. See, Act, §§209.4(e), (f) and 
(9)-
15
 62 AD2d 12, 11 PERB 1J7003 (3d Dept 1978) affd, 46 NY2d 1034, 12 PERB1J7006 
(1979). 
16
 Supra, note 9. 
17
 149 AD2d 516, 22 PERB 1J7516 (2d Dept 1989). 
201 AD2d 258, 27 PERB 1T7503 (1s Dept 1994). 
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(hereinafter NYC); and City of Mount Vernon v Cuevas™ (hereinafter Mt. Vernon). 
In Greenburgh, the Second Department vacated an interest arbitration award that 
granted various negotiation demands for Town of Greenburgh police officers including 
one allowing Town police officers to have the option of having disciplinary charges 
determined by an arbitrator or the town board. The Second Department vacated the 
award on the grounds that police discipline constituted a prohibited subject based on 
the Westchester County Police Act20 (hereinafter WCPA). The WCPA, like the RCPA, 
granted town boards or boards of police commissioners in Westchester County the 
power and authority over police discipline. 
The First Department's decision in NYC concluded that police discipline is a 
prohibited subject of bargaining based on the same New York City Charter provision 
relied upon by the Court in NYCPBA. In Mount Vernon, the Third Department 
concluded that a municipal police disciplinary procedure for that city is a prohibited 
subject based on the State Legislature's enactment of the City of Mount Vernon's City 
Charter21 in 1922 that provides the City's Commissioner of Public Safety with the power 
and authority over police discipline. 
In its exceptions, the PBA contends that the ALJ's articulation of the holding in 
NYCPBA is overbroad because the ALJ inferred that the duty to negotiate discipline 
under the Act can be preempted by any preexisting local law, rather than a special state 
law, relating to employee discipline. We agree. As the Court expressly held: "police 
discipline may not be a subject of collective bargaining under the Taylor Law when the 
19
 289 AD2d 674, 34 PERB 1J7038 (3d Dept 2001). 
20
 L 1936, c 104, as amended, L 1941, c 812. 
21
 L 1922, c 490. 
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Legislature has expressly committed disciplinary authority over a police department to 
local officials."22 (Emphasis added) We find that to mean that only special state 
legislation, enacted prior to CSL §§75 and 76, granting specific local officials the power 
and authority over police discipline, can preempt police discipline negotiations under 
NYCPBA. 
We reject, however, the PBA's claim that the Court's conclusions with respect to 
the RCPA in NYCPBA are limited to the unenforceability of the disciplinary arbitration 
clause. The Court's repeated favorable references to Clarkstown demonstrates that it 
agreed with the Second Department's holding that the RCPA renders the subject of 
police discipline a prohibited subject of bargaining for Rockland County towns. Second, 
the Court, in concluding that disciplinary interrogation procedures for New York City 
police constituted a prohibited subject of bargaining, did not draw a distinction between 
the content of the RCPA and the special state legislation delegating police discipline to 
the New York City Police Commissioner. Therefore, contrary to the PBA's argument, the 
Court in NYCPBA did not draw a distinction between the negotiability of police 
disciplinary procedures and procedures to investigate police misconduct that can lead to 
discipline. 
We next turn to the PBA's exceptions premised on claims that the VPDL does 
not render its police interrogation proposal a prohibited subject. Contrary to the PBA's 
argument, VPDL commits executive power and authority relating to police discipline to a 
village board of trustees or municipal board. The statute specifically defines Village 
boards of trustees or municipal boards as police commissioners empowered to 
6 NY3d at 570. 
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establish and enforce police disciplinary rules and regulations.23 The VPDL grants 
village police commissioners similar power and authority over police discipline to those 
granted to the New York City Police Commissioner under the special state legislation 
examined in NYCPBA. 
Furthermore, we reject the PBA's argument that the use of the term 
"investigation" in Unconsol §5711 -q(9) is inapplicable to pre-charge disciplinary 
interrogations. The VPDL delegates to village boards of trustees or municipal boards 
acting as police commissioners authority to establish and enforce rules and regulations 
with respect to police disciplinary investigations. The statutory provision cannot be 
reasonably construed as limiting statutory authority to conduct investigations only after 
the issuance of disciplinary charges. 
We also reject the PBA's reliance on the Court's decision in NYCTA.24 Relying on 
the text and history of legislation following the enactment of the Act, the Court in NYCTA 
held that employee organization representation during an interrogation is not an 
inherent right under the Act. The PBA relies upon the following dicta in the NYCTA 
decision to argue that the Court ruled that representation during an interrogation is a 
mandatory subject for all public employees under the Act: 
Of course, employees may seek such representation in 
collective bargaining; in doing so, they are protected by the 
Taylor Law's provision in Civil Service Law §203, that they 
shall have the right...to negotiate collectively with their public 
employers in the determination of their terms and conditions 
of employment.25 
23
 Unconsol §§5711-q(2), (4), (8) and (9). 
24
 Supra, note 5. 
25
 8 NY3d at 233, 40 PERB at 7003. 
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Contrary to the PBA's argument, we do not construe the above quoted dicta as 
constituting a modification or limitation of the Court's holding in NYCPBA regarding the 
negotiability of police discipline in certain political subdivisions subject to preexisting 
special state statutes. 
Although the VPDL was enacted subsequent to the Act, as well as CSL §§75 and 
76, it constitutes a mere non-substantive recodification of the 1939 Village Law 
provisions. The authority and power over police discipline granted to Westchester 
County village boards of trustees or municipal boards remained the same as in the 1939 
provisions and are equivalent to the powers granted town boards under the WCPA and 
RCPA. An examination of the VPDL's legislative history reveals that it is silent on the 
question of negotiability of village police discipline in Westchester County.26 Therefore, 
based upon the Court's holding and reasoning in NYCPBA, we find that the VPDL 
renders the PBA's proposal a prohibited subject of bargaining.27 
Finally, we examine the ALJ's decision in the context of the recent amendment to 
the Act establishing an improper employer practice for the denial of employee 
organization representation, in certain circumstances, during questioning by an 
employer. Section 209-a.1 (g) of the Act states that it is an improper practice for an 
employer: 
to fail to permit or refuse to afford a public employee the 
right, upon the employee's demand, to representation by a 
representative of the employee organization, or the designee 
of such organization, which has been certified or recognized 
under this article when at the time of questioning by the 
26
 Bill Jacket, L 1972, c 891. 
27
 In contrast, Village Law §8-804, originally acted in 1972, is a general law which does 
not predate CSL §§75 and 76 and therefore does not render police discipline a 
prohibited subject of bargaining under NYCPBA. 
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employer of such employee it reasonably appears that he or 
i she may be the subject of a potential disciplinary action. If 
representation is requested, and the employee is a potential 
target of disciplinary action at the time of questioning, a 
reasonable period of time shall be afforded to the employee 
to obtain such representation. It shall be an affirmative 
defense to any improper practice charge under paragraph 
(g) of this subdivision that the employee has the right, 
pursuant to statute, interest arbitration award, collectively 
negotiated agreement, policy or practice, to present to a 
hearing officer or arbitrator evidence of the employer's failure 
to provide representation and to obtain exclusion of the 
resulting evidence upon demonstration of such failure. 
Nothing in this section shall grant an employee any right to 
representation by the representative of an employee 
organization in any criminal investigation. 
In light of the text and legislative history of this 2007 amendment to the Act, we 
believe that it was solely aimed at overturning the Court's decision in NYCTA and not 
the NYCPBA decision. Although the amendment, as remedial legislation, is entitled to a 
) liberal construction with respect to the representational rights protected, even a liberal 
construction is insufficient to outweigh the clear statutory language and explicit 
legislative purpose for the law.28 On its face, §209-a.1(g) of the Act does not mandate 
the negotiability of the subject, but it does permit an employer to defend against a 
charge by demonstrating that the right to representation during questioning is available 
based on a negotiated agreement, policy, practice or interest arbitration award. 
Furthermore, the Senate sponsor's memorandum in support of the amendment states 
that it was specifically aimed at overturning NYCTA.29 In contrast, proposed bills 
introduced to overturn NYCPBA have not become law.30 Therefore, we conclude that 
^ McKinneys, Statutes §321. 
29
 Bill Jacket, L 2007, c 244. 
30
 2006 NY Assembly Bill A.11178; 2007 NY Assembly Bill A.8139; Governor's Veto 
Message, Veto #96 (2007). 
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§209-a.1 (g) of the Act does not transform the PBA's proposal from a prohibited to a 
mandatory subject of bargaining. 
Based on the foregoing, we grant the PBA's exceptions, in part, but affirm the ALJ's 
decision sustaining the Village's improper practice charge. 
IT IS, THEREFORE, ORDERED that the charge is hereby sustained and the PBA is 
directed to withdraw Demand #15 from interest arbitration. 
DATED: December 14, 2007 
Albany, New York 
// Jerome Lefkowitz, Chairman 
Robert S. Kite, Member 
) 
/V^T 
STATE OF NEW YORK 
PUBLIC EMPLOYMENT RELATIONS BOARD 
In the Matter of 
LOCAL 338, INTERNATIONAL BROTHERHOOD 
OF TEAMSTERS, 
Petitioner, 
-and- CASE NO. C-5728 
TOWN OF KORTRIGHT, 
Employer, 
-and-
LOCAL 76B, AMALGAMATED INDUSTRIAL 
UNION, IUE, AFL-CIO, 
Incumbent. 
CERTIFICATION OF REPRESENTATIVE AND ORDER TO NEGOTIATE 
A representation proceeding having been conducted in the above matter by the 
Public Employment Relations Board in accordance with the Public Employees' Fair 
Employment Act and the Rules of Procedure of the Board, and it appearing that a 
negotiating representative has been selected,1 
Pursuant to the authority vested in the Board by the Public Employees' Fair 
Employment Act, 
1The incumbent bargaining agent, Local 76B, Amalgamated Industrial Union, IUE, AFL-
CIO, has disclaimed any interest in representing the existing bargaining unit. 
Certification - C-5728 - 2 -
IT IS HEREBY CERTIFIED that the Local 338, International Brotherhood of 
Teamsters has been designated and selected by a majority of the employees of the 
above-named public employer, in the unit agreed upon by the parties and described 
below, as their exclusive representative for the purpose of collective negotiations and 
the settlement of grievances. 
Included: All Town of Kortright highway employees. 
Excluded: All elected officials, seasonal employees and employees who work 
an average of less than 21 hours per week. 
FURTHER, IT IS ORDERED that the above named public employer shall 
negotiate collectively with the Local 338, International Brotherhood of Teamsters. The 
duty to negotiate collectively includes the mutual obligation to meet at reasonable times 
and confer in good faith with respect to wages, hours, and other terms and conditions of 
employment, or the negotiation of an agreement, or any question arising thereunder, 
and the execution of a written agreement incorporating any agreement reached if 
requested by either party. Such obligation does not compel either party to agree to a 
proposal or require the making of a concession. 
DATED: December 14, 2007 
Albany, New York / 7 
'/Jerome LefkjZ^witz' Chairman 
Robert Sf Hite, Member 
